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Does the Tail Wag the Dog:
Stock Index Futures
Abstract
This paper investigates the impact of the trading of stock index
futures on the underlying stocks in the cash market. The Tail Wagging
the Dog Effect is evaluated by looking at the relationship between the
change in futures prices and the subsequent change in the spot index.
Additionally, the crises at expiration phenomena of the impact of the
expiration of the futures contracts on the underlying index is eval-
uated.
Using intraday futures price data for the Major Market Index which
were traded on the Chicago Board of Trade, during the period 23 August
1984 to 15 August 1986, a significant relationship between changes in
futures prices and subsequent changes in the spot index were found;
the tail does wag the dog. For the Major Market Index, the tail wag-
ging the dog effect was particularly strong during the expiration
month and week, supporting the notion of the crises at expiration.
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Does the Tail Wag the Dog?: Stock Index Futures
The rise in program trading based on a comparatively narrow blue
chip stock market barometer, the Major Market Index (MMI) , is said to
be fueling the volatile price swings in the stock market, a case of
the tail wagging the dog. The MMI is a price-weighted index of 20
very actively traded stocks, 16 of which are included in the Dow Jones
30 Industrials. Because of its relatively small size, the MMI is ex-
pected to be more easily arbitragible than other stock index futures
contracts. Basically program trading is taking a position (long or
short) in a portfolio of stocks comprising the index and simultaneously
taking an opposite position in the index futures contracts. The objec-
tive of the program trade is to create a "risk free" position which
earns a return in excess of the currently available risk free return.
These so-called program trades may move both the futures and the
spot market. The chain of causality may work as follows: (1) The
investors believe the stock market will rise and they purchase futures
contracts in expectation of higher equity values. The purchase of
futures contracts is preferable because they entail no initial invest-
ment and lower transaction costs than a position in the stock market;
(2) The rise in futures prices causes an imbalance between the prices
of the futures and the underlying index; as this premium between the
futures and the index increases, it may become more profitable to
execute a program trade, and (3) The simultaneous sale of the futures
and purchase of the underlying index will cause the premium between
the futures and the index to shrink. Changes in other factors, such
-2-
as interest rates can also have an effect on the equilibrium relation-
ship between the index price and the futures price, thereby changing
the premium or discount between the two markets. Program traders can
take advantage of any change in the spread between the markets. It
does not matter what causes the change in spreads, either internal
factors like changes in investor expectations or external factors such
as interest rate changes. All program trading does is to bring cash
and futures prices together. The program trade may be an essential
mechanism which insures that the futures prices and the underlying
equity prices are efficiently determined.
To date most of the literature on the impact of futures trading on
the cash market have focused on the changes in spot price volatility
because of the initiation or cessation of futures trading. A common
conclusion of these studies is that the futures market has a smoothing
effect on the cash market by stabilizing the spot price. The recent
uproar with the "triple witching hour" and the so-called "crises at
expiration" caused by the expiration of stock index futures and op-
tions, at the close on the third Friday of March, June, September, and
December brings to question the smoothing influence that futures con-
2tracts have on the underlying index.
If the market is efficient, prices adjust instantaneously to re-
flect all relevant information and knowledge of such information
cannot lead to excess risk adjusted returns. The central concept in
3the efficient market hypothesis is the fair game model. A sequence
of past returns over time is a fair game if today's price reflects the
then available information, making it impossible to earn excess risk
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adjusted returns by trading on that information. If the information
set today contains all of the information known and used by the market
participants in the spot market in determining the spot price, one of
the components of the information set is the previous change in the
price of futures contracts.
The title of this article asks the question, Does the Tail Wag the
Dog? The financial press and the SEC have answered this question in
the affirmative. This paper investigates the impact of the futures
market on the spot market, the existence of the tail wagging the dog
effect, by evaluating the relationship between index futures price
changes and subsequent spot index price changes. In addition, we eval-
uate the degree to which the expiration of the futures contract affects
the underlying index. The data and methodology is discussed in the
next section.
Data and Methodology
This paper uses intraday spot and futures prices of the Chicago
Board of Trade's Major Market Index (MMI) and the Maxi Major Market
Index (MMMI) over the period August 23, 1984-August 15, 1986.
For every reported change in the index price, the closest pre-
ceding change in the futures price was identified. The index was
reported at least once every minute in some cases three or four times
per minute, so that a percentage change in the index at a minimum was
available for each minute of trading. The index value and the closest
futures price were paired and this was the data base used in the
study. For contracts that have matured, the number of observations
for each contract is in the thousands.
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Two regressions were run for each individual contract: (1) the
relationship between the change in the spot index and the change in
the closest previous futures price; and (2) a dummy variable regres-
I
sion on the same data controlled for the expiration week or month. A
discussion of the methodology is presented in Appendix A.
Results
The detailed regression results are shown in Table I and Table II
in the Appendix. The exact statistical parameters are not of para-
mount importance, but rather the number of contracts that showed a
significant relationship and the time pattern of the results. In
Exhibit 1, these results are summarized.
Exhibit I Frequency and Timing of Regression Results
Maxi Major Market Index Major Market Index
Number of contracts studied 11 24
Number showing significance
at the 10% level 7 16
Number showing significance
if results were random 1 2
Number significant Number significant
before December 1985/ before April 1985/
Number of Contracts 0/4 Number of Contracts 3/9
Number significant after Number significant after t
December 1985/Number of April 1985/Number of
'
Contracts 7/7 Contracts 13/15
A majority of the contracts studied showed a significant relation-
ship between the change in the futures price and the subsequent change
in the index. This supports the notion that the tail is wagging the
-5-
dog. This' result was present for both the Maxi and the regular MM
I
contracts. Of interest is the fact that when each of the contracts
was first traded, there existed a period of time when there was no
relationship between the change in the futures price and the subse-
quent change in the index. For the Maxi contract this was the first
four months of trading from September to December 1985. And for the
MMI during the first nine months of trading, six out of nine contracts
showed no relationship between futures and subsequent spot price
changes. This could indicate that either arbitrage opportunities were
not available during the initial trading of the contracts or program
traders were unable to immediately take advantage of the opportunities
if they were available.
However, after the initial start up periods, the results indicate
that there exists a strong relationship between futures and subsequent
index price changes in seven out of the last seven months for the Maxi
and thirteen out of the last fifteen months for the MMI contracts.
These results indicate that it is reasonable to answer the question
posed in the title in the affirmative, the tail is wagging the dog at
least in the case of the MMI and Maxi MMI.
Given the existence of the relationship between changes in futures
prices and subsequent changes in the index, we hypothesize that this
relationship will be strongest during the latter part of the contract
life. This is so because regardless of when the arbitrageurs execute
a program trade they usually close their position at expiration or
just before the contract expires. Hence we hypothesize that the
coefficients B~ and 8. of the dummy variable regression will be
-6-
signif icantly different from zero. This will indicate that the time
one month (6_) and one week (8,) before expiration has a different
5 b
relationship for the futures and the spot than that found over the
entire life of the contract. The dummy variable regression results
are shown in Table II in the Appendix. These results are summarized
in Exhibit 2.
Exhibit 2 Frequency and Timing of Dummy
Variable Regression Results
Maxi Major Market Index
Number of times the end
of contract trading was
different from rest of
contract trading/
Number of contracts
Last Month
2/11
Last Week
2/11
Major Market Index
Number of times the end
of contract trading was
different from rest of
contract trading/
Number of contracts
Number significant since
August 85/Number of contracts
11/24
11/12
11/24
11/12
For the Maxi MMI contract, the trading during the last week or
last month of the contract appears to be the same as the trading over
the life of the contract. The implication of this is that any depen-
dencies between the futures and subsequent spot price changes are
spread out across the entire trading life of a contract and not
clustered during the expiration of the contract. Program traders,
-7-
arbitraging the Maxi MMI appear to take positions when arbitrage
opportunities present themselves and they do not necessarily wait
until contract expirations before unwinding their positions.
The results for the MMI contract are different. The relationship
during the last month or last week of the contract is different from
the relationship found over the entire life of the contract for eleven
out of the twelve contracts traded between August 1985 and July 1986.
The program traders seem to take positions and systematically unwind
them during the latter part of the contract's life, thereby intensify-
ing the relationship near the contract expiration.
The difference in the behavior of the arbitrageurs trading the
Maxi and MMI contracts is an area for further inquiry. The traders of
the Maxi appear to trade uniformly over the contract life whereas the
traders of the MMI seem to all unwind their position close to expira-
tion.
Conclusion
We have investigated the impact of changes in futures prices on
subsequent changes in spot prices, i.e., the tail wagging the dog
effect, and the degree to which the expiration of a futures contract
affects the underlying index price. Using intraday spot and futures
prices of the Major Market Index and the Maxi Major Market Index for
August 23, 1984-August 15, 1986, we have found a significant relation-
ship between changes in futures prices and subsequent changes in spot
prices; the tail does wag the dog. This is especially true during the
1985-1986 period. However for the Maxi MMI contract there is no evi-
dence that the trading during the last week or last month is different
-8-
than the trading over the entire life of the contract. For the MM
I
contract, the significant tail wagging the dog effect is present
during the expiration month or week and this is especially true during
the 1985-1986 period.
-9-
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APPENDIX A
Research Methodology
The empirically testable form of the "tail wagging the dog effect"
is
:
*nl|li= a+ B ln ^LJlJ+et , (1)
where S and F represent the spot and futures prices, respectively, T
represents maturity of a futures contract and e is assumed to have
expected value of zero with constant variance. In eq . (1), B = 0, if
there is no relationship between changes in future prices and sub-
sequent changes in spot prices. Alternatively, if 8 * 0, there is an
empirically determined relationship between changes in futures prices
and subsequent changes in spot prices.
First, we attempt to investigate the impact of futures prices on
the underlying spot prices using eq . (1). The null hypothesis to be
tested would be that 8=0.
Second, the basic model in eq . (1) is modified to control for the
expiration week or month to evaluate any differences in the rela-
tionship based on nearness to contract expiration as:
S
*n
-§7 = a i + 6 i * n FT^ry +8 2 D i + 8 3 (D i • *n -lTtV (2)
s
en
"if - a 2
+ 6
4
tnFl£ff + 3 5 D 2 + 8 6 (D 2 ' '"fT^TT5 (3)
where all terms are defined as before and
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D;l is a dummy variable equal to zero for all trading days prior to
the last month of trading and equal to one for all trading days
during the expiration month of the contract;
T>2 is a dummy variable equal to zero for all trading days prior to
the last five days of trading and equal to one for the last five
trading days before contract expiration.
Table I
Regression Results*
Maxi Major Market Index
fContract a i
Sept . 85 3.5
(1.9 E 6 )
3.1
(1.8 E J )
Oct. 85 8.2
(5.6
Hi
E
5
)
2.8
(4.9
*-1
E
J
)
Nov. 85 3.1
(2.5 E 6 )
3.4
(1.3 3E l )
Dec. 85 1.2
(1.4
E_
6
E )
1.2
(3.1 3E J )
Jan. 86 -2.0
(2.7
E_
6
E~ )
2.0
(8.5 3E J )
Feb. 86 3.5
(1.5 E 6 )
1.3
(3.7 E J )
Mar. 86 2.8
(1.5
E_
6
E )
1.0
(2.8 E J )
Apr. 86 3.1
(1.7
E1
E
6
)
2.3
(4.2
E
.1
E
J
)
May 86 1.4
(1.5
E_
6
E )
3.1
(3.5 E J )
Jun. 86 1.9
(1.3 E 6 )
1.1
(1.9
-?
E
J
)
Jul. 86 -4.3
(1.8
E_
6
E )
1.3
(3.9
Adjusted R2 Pr(3=0) a Nb
0.0000 86% 9188
0.0023 98% 7358
0.0001 98% 6815
0.0000 71% 23645
0.0004 1% 13787
0.0006 0.04% 17724
0.0006 0.03% 21953
0.0015 0.01% 18762
0.0046 0.01% 17354
0.0014 0.01% 24173
0.0008 0.07% 12751
Major Market Index
Aug. 84 3.2 E~_
5
-1.7 yT\ 0.0000 99% 4076
(6.1 E b ) (3.4 E
J
)
Table I (continued)
Regression Results*
Contract a £
Sept . 84 7.9
(4.1 E 6 )
5.1 E~l
(2.1 E J )
Oct. 84 4.1
(4.6 E S
1.6 E~^
(3.5 E J )
Nov. 84 -3.9
(5.1
E1
E
6
)
-9
1.7 E
-
(4.8 E )
Dec. 84 2.1
(2.1 E
A
)
6.6 e~
2
(1.6 E )
Jan. 85 7.7
(5.3
E"
6
-4
E )
-3
7.7 E f
(5.7 E X )
Feb. 85 6.5
(5.2
E"
6
E-
4
)
-2
1.5 E r
(6.5 E i )
Mar. 85 1.6
(3.0 E )
-1.8 E~}
(2.6 E X )
Apr. 85 2.8
(4.1 e"
6
)
2.4 e"^
(2.0 E J )
May 85 1.7
(4.2 e" 6 )
_2
3.2 E
~
(6.0 E )
Jun. 85 1.2
(1.1 3E 3 )
-3
3.5 E
,
(1.1 E Z )
Jul. 85 5.6
(2.7 e"
6
)
3.6 E
-4
(5.8 E )
Aug. 85 -4.9
(5.1
-8.1 E~}
(6.0 E )
Sept . 85 4.5
(2.7 E 6 )
1.1 E~l
(2.1 E J )
Adjusted R2 Pr(8=0) 3 Nb
0.0008 2% 7432
0.0040 .01% 5855
0.0028 .03% 4667
0.0000 69% 10850
0.0000 99% 6125
0.0000 99% 6209
0.0000 48% 10598
0.0002 22% 6291
0.0060 .01% 4833
0.0000 77% 9737
0.0079 .01% 4766
0.0004 18% '.4hn
0.0045 .01% 5705
Table I (continued)
Regression Results*
*^- « *• i!&& ««
2 a b
Contract a 8_ Adjusted R Pr(8=0) N
Oct. 85 1.7 E^ 9.4 E~^ 0.0006 5% 4348
(3.8 E ) (4.9 E )
Nov. 85 4.9 E~_
6
5.4 E~_\ 0.0001 .01% 2534
(5.8 E ) (5.9 E )
Dec. 85 2.0 Z~\ 1.9 E~
2 0.0001 .01% 5808
(3.0 E ) (2.9 E )
Jan. 86 3.0 E~_
6
3.5 E~_l 0.0165 .01% 2811
(3.5 E ) (5.1 E
J
)
Feb. 86 -1.9 E~_6 2.1 E~_ 2 0.^106 .01% 2600
(4.3 E ) (3.9 E )
Mar. 86 3.9 E~j 1.6 E~_ 3 0.0060 .01% 5852
(3.0 E ) (2.6 E )
Apr. 86 6.6 E~j? 4.2 E~ 2 0.0177 .01% 4485
(3.8 E ) (4.6 E )
May 86 1.6 E~J 3.3 E~* 0.0247 .01% 3741
(3.4 E (3.4 E )
Jun. 86 -6.8 E~' 2.4 E~\ 0.0159 .01% 7040
(2.4 E ) (2.3 E
J
)
Jul. 86 -1.2 E~j 2.6 E
-
^
0.0115 .01% 4010
(3.2 E ) (3.8 E )
* The numbers in parentheses represent standard errors,
Pr : = represents the probability that B = 0.
N represents the number of observations.
Table II
Dummy Variable Regression Results*
* n
-IT = °i + 6 i in K^I) + 6 2D i + B 3 (D i *n KT^y )
in -|±L = «
2
+ 6
4
, n _*£L. + B
5
D
2
+ 6, (D 2
£n
.^y)
Maxi Major Market Index
Contract
Sept. 85
Oct. 85
Nov. 85
Dec. 85
Jan. 86
Feb. 86
Mar. 86
Apr. 86
May 86
Jun. 86
Jul. 86
-3
-2.7 E_
(1.0 E )
-3
2.5 E
(2.5 E J )
2.5 E
(2.6 E
-2
-2
6.8 eJ
(1.3 E l )
3.0 E~J.
(2.2 E Z )
-2
2.5 E_,
(i.2 e n
-3
7.2 E
,
(1.2 E )
5.9 E
(1.1 E Z )
1.3 E~J
(1.2 E Z )
3.9 E~_l
(9.2 E J )
2.2 E~
2
(1.2 E
z
)
Pr 8
3
=0
79%
35%
34%
60%
16%
3%
55%
96%
91%
67%
8%
-1.0 eJ
(2.3 E ~)
-2
1.3 E_
(2.4 E Z )
1.6 E~J.
(2.7 E Z )
-2
2.4 E
(2.1 E -)
-?
-i.7 e_;
(3.2 E -)
3.4 E~_l
(1.8 E )
2.6 E~
2
(2.0 E )
-2
2.2 E_
Z
(2.1 E Z )
-1.7 E
,
(1.8 E ")
-2
-2.0 Ej
(1.7 E Z )
-2
5.9 E_
(2.3 E ")
Pr 6 =0
b
64%
60%
55%
29%
59%
h\
18%
vr;
33%
24%
92%
Table II (continued)
Dummy Variable Regression Results*
* n
"f1 = "l + 6 i * n f7^T7 + 8 2 D 1 + 8 3 (D 1 z" fT^i)
, n _|±I = ^ + s 4 ln _*lll_ + b 5 d 2 + 3 6 (D2 £n ^|iil_)
Major Market Index
Contract
Aug. 84
Sept. 84
Oct. 84
Nov. 84
Dec. 84
Jan. 85
Feb. 85
Mar. 85
Apr. 85
May 85
Jun. 85
s.
3
Pr 8
3
=0 8
6
Pr B
6
=0'
-3.8
(4.2
1
E -)
33% 2.0 e~:
(2.2 E )
36%
6.5
(1.1
3
E
Z
)
56%
-9
2.1 E
(1.8 E *)
25%
8.8
(1.1
El?
E
Z
)
44% 2.8 E~2
(1.7 E Z )
11%
-1.2
(1.2 3E Z ) 30% -1.4 E~
2
(1.5 E Z )
36%
9.4
(6.8 E X )
16% -8.5 E~2
(1.1)
93%
6.1
(1.4 3E *) 99%
-9
-2.6 E *
(2.22)
99%
-2.4
-?
E
1
98% -5.6 E~
2
98%
(1.7 E S (2.43)
.2
(1.27)
3.6 yTI
(1.3 E Z )
1.5 E~
2
(1.3 E
z
)
-6.2 E~ 2
(4.3 E Z )
87%
78%
24%
14%
.18
(1.97)
6.9 E~^
(2.1 E Z )
2.5 E~
(1.9 E Z )
-2.1 e_;
(7.4 E ~)
92%
74%
18%
97%
Table II (continued)
Dummy Variable Regression Results*
S
* n
"if = *i
+ B
i
* n if^ir + 8 2 D i + 6 3 (D i in hSi7>
S
£n
-rr
= a
2
+ 6
4
tn fT^TT + S 5 D 2 + 6 6 (D 2 £n if^D
Contract
Jul. 85
Aug. 85
Sept. 85
Oct. 85
Nov. 85
Dec. 85
Jan. 86
Feb. 86
Mar. 86
Apr. 86
May 86
8
3
pr e
3
=o
a
-1.6
(1.1 ft
24%
-2.9 2%
(1.34)
8.4
(1.2 ft
48%
1.4
(8.1 ft
.4%
2.8
(2.2 ft
.01%
2.8
(9.9 E J )
.43%
3.6
(1.1 E l )
.12%
2.5
(9.6 E
J
)
.89%
2.3
(8.0 ft
.48%
2.6
(1.0 ft
1%
2.6
(1.2 E ")
3%
6
6
Pr e =o
a
-3.8
(1.3
«3
E
C
)
77%
-4.12 .5%
(1.49)
-2.9
(2.1 ft
17%
4.0
(1.6 ft
1%
4.0
(1.8 e -)
3%
2.5
(1.3 ft
fV".
5.5
(1.6 ft
.07%
4.2
(1.7 ft
.5%
-6.5
(1.0 ft
.01%
3.4
(1.7 E
J
)
.84%
4.7
(1.8
1
E )
.94%
Table II (continued)
Dummy Variable Regression Results*
* n
-fr - a i + s i ln if^iy + B 2 D i + s 3 (D i en ift^
£n
t+1 F(t) F(t)
— " °2 + 6 4
Zn TT^U + S 5 °2 + S 6 (D 2 ln F^Ty }
Contract Pr 8
3
=0 Pr 8,=0
b
Jun. 86
Jul. 86
3.6 E
-2
.01°
(9.4 E )
7.5 E"^ .01°
(1.2 E l )
-2
2.1 E
*
(6.7 E J )
6.2 e_:
(2.4 E Z )
.21%
1%
* The numbers in parentheses represent standard errors.
Pr 6
.
=0 represents the probability that 8 . = 0.
l l
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